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The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 18 December 1971 is the most significant piece of federal legislation dealing with Alaska since the Alaska Statehood Act of 1958. The settlement is the largest single Native claims settlement in the history of the United States, and it has far-reaching consequences for the political and economic future of Alaska. . the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act is the sequel to the Alaska Statehood Act. Indeed, it can be thought of as a kind of statehood act for the Native people, for like the Statehood Act, the Native Claims Settlement Act is designed to promote political independence and economic well-being through natural resource development. Statehood for Alaska resulted from an internal political drive that spanned almost half a century. . the heart of the Statehood Act was the provision that granted to the new State the right to select some 104 million acres of land from federal holdings, with the exception of any Native lands, which were undefined. When the Natives claimed that much of the land initially chosen by the State was theirs by virtue of historical use and occupancy, the Secretary of the Interior late in 1966 imposed a moratorium, or freeze, on all further dispositions of federal land in Alaska pending a final resolution of the Native land issue by Congress. A speedy determination of Native land rights became a political and economic imperative for the state government ., and even more so shortly after when massive oil fields were discovered at Prudhoe Bay and the land freeze became an obstacle to construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. . Economic development is the idée fixe of the Settlement Act just as it was the idée fixe of the Alaska Statehood Act. Fee title to a large amount of land, mineral and timber rights, profit corporate structures, ownership stocks, revenue sharing, and all the rest make it clear that the and claims settlement was intended primarily as a vehicle for natural resource development in Alaska. . The effects of the Settlement Act on the political balance of the State will be enormous. The Natives and their organizations now have control of two resources that guarantee them a permanent, prominent place in Alaska politics, namely, money and land. . Because of its economic development orientation, the Settlement Act may very well lead to an intensification of the long-standing development versus conservation conflict in Alaska . However, on many issues, even development issues, there may not be anything that resembles a unified Native position. For its part, the state government does not regard the Natives as its prime political antagonist. That role is still reserved for its traditional enemy, the federal government. . Indeed, the acceptance of the land claims settlement by all of the established economic interests in Alaska - the state government the corporate mineral developers, the chambers of commerce, the independent miners, and the labour interests - stems from the fact that it does not substantially redistribute existing wealth among those groups in the State. Rather, it promises to increase the total amount of wealth available to all; the Natives, for the first time, included. . The Natives carefully made their economic development interests known to the public and to government officials. . the land claims movement in Alaska had a very conservative style, marked by repeated references to the welfare of "all Alaskans" and frequent displays of the symbols of American political life. To be sure, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, with its overriding commitment to economic development, is very much in the American, and Alaskan, political tradition.

This paper summarizes in non-tabular form the results of a study of Native voting behaviour in rural Alaska between 1958 and 1968. Election results from every precinct corresponding to a community identified by the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska as "predominantly Native" were recorded on IBM cards. . It should be noted that the resultant data pertain only to rural Native electoral behaviour. . The Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska estimates that something over 70 per cent of Alaska's Natives live in 178 villages or towns that are predominantly Native - places where half or more of the residents are Native. Another 25 per cent of Alaska's Natives live in urban centres of Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, Ketchikan, Kodiak and Sitka. The remainder live in non-Native towns and in one- or two-family locations. It should also be noted that most Native villages have some resident non-Natives whose votes are included in the published precinct total. In the cases of Dillingham and Bethel, this non-Native population component is sizeable. . Data show that 12,097 rural Natives voted in the 1968 general election. This is 4,931 more than voted in the general election a decade earlier, and represents a 69 per cent increase between 1958 and 1968. The number of Eskimo voters almost doubled during this period - from 4,485 to 8,640 - whereas the number of Southeast Indian (Tlingit, Haida, and Tsimpsian) voters stayed relatively constant - from 1,101 in 1958 to 1,218 in 1968, or an 11 per cent increase. Interior Indian (Athabascan) voters increased from 1,186 in 1958 to 1,674 in 1968, and Aleut voters increased from 394 in 1958 to 565 in 1968, 43 per cent and 41 per cent increases respectively. The largest number of Eskimos and Interior Indians voted in 1968. However, the largest number of Aleuts and Southeast Indians voted in 1964. . Of the two major U.S. political parties, the Democratic party is clearly the stronger among rural Native voters in Alaska. (During the period 1960 to 1968, no candidate identified with a party other than the Democratic and Republican parties drew an appreciable vote.) In each election contest for U.S. president, state governor, U.S. representative and U.S. senator between 1960 and 1968 (5 general elections and 14 separate contests), the percentage of votes cast for Democratic candidates in the Native villages exceeded the percentage of votes cast for the same Democratic candidates in the state as a whole by an average of 12 percentage points. In none of the 14 single contests did the state-wide electoral support for a Democratic candidate exceed the Native village electoral support. Although the data show a clear over-all preference for the Democratic party in rural Native precincts, they also show that the patterns of party preference are not static. In 1968, for example, 60 villages (38 per cent of the total) registered a Republican or no clear party preference. This compares with 30 such Republican or competitive villages (19 per cent of the total number) in 1966, and only 11 (7 per cent of the total number) in 1964. Of the 54 villages which registered a Republican party preference in the five general elections between 1960 and 1968, 26 did so in only one of these elections. Of the 17 Eskimo villages that indicated a Republican party preference in 1960, only 9 did so again in 1968. The villages in individual election districts show different degrees of attachment to the dominant party. In the 1968 general election in the seven election districts controlled by Native voters, for example, villagers voted solidly Democratic in four districts . and highly fragmented their vote along party lines in three districts . The figures themselves offer no clues to the reasons for shifting party preference. . .

Frontmatter -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1 The Doctrine of Sovereignty -- 2 Athenian Democracy -- 3 The Roman Republic -- 4 Countervailance Theory in Medieval Law, Catholic Ecclesiology, and Huguenot Political Theory -- 5 The Republic of Venice -- 6 The Dutch Republic -- 7 The Development of Constitutional Government and Countervailance Theory in Seventeenth-Century England -- 8 American Constitutionalism -- 9 Modern Britain -- Epilogue -- References -- Index

Over the past half century Canada became a signatory to a number of complex and integrated international agreements. Canada's obligations under these agreements have often been ill-defined and vague. This is particularly evident in regards to Canada's freshwater resources. This article will examine Canada's international trade obligations, liabilities and responsibilities under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It will argue that Canada's piecemeal approach to fresh water is insufficient to safeguard its sovereignty over this indispensable resource. The article begins by providing a comprehensive and global perspective on trade in water by illustrating the prominent position that water is beginning to assume in the discourse of international relations. After situating the issue of trade in water in the global context, the North American perspective is examined. The author evaluates the applicable NAFTA provisions, corresponding tribunal case law, and competing treaty interpretations that potentially threaten Canadian sovereignty over its fresh water resources. The author then outlines and critiques the actions and policies the Canadian Government has implemented to protect its domestic water supply. Finally, a number of policy options are presented that may help ensure Canada's sovereignty over its fresh water resources. The author's ultimate conclusion is that only through amendments to NAFTA can Canada once again become author of its own future.

Over the past half century Canada became a signatory to a number of complex and integrated international agreements. Canada's obligations under these agreements have often been ill-defined and vague. This is particularly evident in regards to Canada's freshwater resources. This article will examine Canada's international trade obligations, liabilities and responsibilities under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It will argue that Canada's piecemeal approach to fresh water is insufficient to safeguard its sovereignty over this indispensable resource. The article begins by providing a comprehensive and global perspective on trade in water by illustrating the prominent position that water is beginning to assume in the discourse of international relations. After situating the issue of trade in water in the global context, the North American perspective is examined. The author evaluates the applicable NAFTA provisions, corresponding tribunal case law, and competing treaty interpretations that potentially threaten Canadian sovereignty over its fresh water resources. The author then outlines and critiques the actions and policies the Canadian Government has implemented to protect its domestic water supply. Finally, a number of policy options are presented that may help ensure Canada's sovereignty over its fresh water resources. The author's ultimate conclusion is that only through amendments to NAFTA can Canada once again become author of its own future.